State-making almost never occurs in isolation. Rulers monitor other states, and often adopt organizational structures and strategies that seem to be working well elsewhere. This is especially true of states that are developing later than others around them. Their evolution is often shaped by their attempts to imitate states that are or appear to be more developed, successful or efficient. This paper uses a case study of one prominent example of imitation, Peter the Great's (1682-1725) westernizing administrative reforms in Russia, to explore how the process of imitation works and to assess some of its consequences.

As the quotation above indicates, Peter the great dramatically transformed Russia by importing a wide variety of western ideas, customs, and technologies. We use both rational choice and institutionalist theories of diffusion an imitation to assess Peter's administrative reforms. Our most general conclusion is that although Peter was aware of the problems inherent in borrowing from more developed countries, and tried to modify the models he imitated to fit them into the Russian context, his reforms failed because Russia in the early 18th century could not be effectively governed by a centralized bureaucratic administration. This analysis has implications for understanding the nature of the radical right vote, and their potential for success. The radical right has been successful in attracting a similar percentage of male and female blue-collar workers. Future research could examine in more detail the reasons behind the radical right's appeal to blue-collar workers. However, as the industrial sector contracts and workers are channeled into different types of occupations, the radical right appeal to blue-collar workers may actually have a negative impact on their vote. The gender gap may indicate that the radical right will have to change their appeal in order to attract more voters.