The utility of the sociological classics today lies not in the particular propositions they contain, most of which have either been refuted or formulated more precisely by contemporary scholars, but in the general theoretical and methodological orientations they exemplify. The complexity and richness of their theoretical frameworks allows for multiple interpretations -- we thus see many competing versions of Marxists, Weberians, and Durkhiemians.

This paper will illustrate a particular neo-Weberian approach to historical sociology. Like earlier readings of Weber (Parsons 1937, Bendix 1977, Collins 1986) our interpretation is shaped by our own theoretical perspective. We believe that the core of Weber's approach to historical analysis corresponds to emerging developments in sociological versions of rational choice theory (Hechter, 1987; Brinton 1988; Levi 1988, 1997; Coleman 1990; Kiser 1994, 1999; Adams 1996; Brustein 1996). Both perspectives rely on methodological individualism, assumptions about intentional action, and the use of clear, abstract models of organizational and institutional structures.

Our rational choice interpretation of Weber is roughly analogous to interpretations of Marx proposed recently by Elster (1985) and Roemer (1986). Just as they outlined an "Analytical Marxism," this paper is a preliminary attempt to illustrate an Analytical Weberianism. Instead of attempting to specify the research strategy suggested by this Analytical Weberian approach in abstract terms (see Kiser and Hechter [1998] for a preliminary attempt), we provide an extended illustration. We explore the main causes of the bureaucratization of states, in the two arenas that dominated early modern state structures - tax administration and armies.

Our arguments begin with insights from Weber, which are further developed using the analytical tools of contemporary agency theory. However, our goal is not to turn Weber into a contemporary economist, but just the opposite: to use Weber to broaden the scope and explanatory power of agency theory.