This chapter explores how competition among political parties under these conditions of de jure judicial

independence relates to de facto levels of judicial independence in Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union. It begins by discussing the two phenomena theoretically and then addresses

accompanying issues of measurement before presenting data on the levels of competition and judicial

independence in the post‐communist states. Results show that a consistent and positive relationship

between levels of political competition and de facto judicial independence, and that the relationship is

conditional on the level of democracy in a given state. The level of economic development as well as the

time since a state began its transition to democracy is also consistently associated with judicial

independence, with economic development demonstrating a strong positive relationship, and the time

since transition a strong negative relationship. A striking finding is that neither bilateral democracy and

governance assistance nor the influence of EU candidacy shows any relationship with judicial

independence. The results of this chapter have important implications not only for the popular

"insurance" model of judicial independence, but also for the literatures on the rule of law and economic

growth, transitions from communism, European integration, and democracy promotion.